Majority of Digg Commenters Appear to Believe that Latest Terrorist Scare is Propoganda…
…Showing that the majority of Digg users are sadly naive.
I like Digg but sometimes the anonymous comments concerning anything political are just too much to take. You’d think there might have been even a little reassessment from the left given the news that yet another group of Islamic extremists were set on blowing up airplanes over U.S. airspace. Instead, look at these comments:
With hours of worthless news coverage of this supposedly monumental event, no one in the news stopped to think, “Are we just pawns spoon-feeding the masses what the government wants to spread?”
Just wait until we get closer to the midterms
Perhaps just a new way to say “OMG Terrorism Alert Orange!!” since we no longer buy into the original song and dance.
This false flag terror scare is no different than all the others.
It goes on and on.
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August 21st, 2006 at 5:36 am
Yep. Cole, Madrid and 9/11, were hoaxes as well.
August 21st, 2006 at 6:50 am
No doubt that there is a great deal of off the cuff cynicism. This sort of bluster is a commonality of pretty much any anonymous forum. But continued reporting on this event has shown that the “attacks” were not exactly imminent or certain and that the purported terrorists’ scheme might not have been feasible at all. The current administration in The States has no one to blame but themselves for the doubters, as it is their continued politicization of the terrorism issue that has given rise to the phenomenon. All to say, I’d not go out of my way to defend the Diggers, but there is a good argument to be made to support the point they’re making. — MDT
August 21st, 2006 at 10:10 am
What if a conspiracy theory IS the conspiracy theory? ( If it floats like a rock, make a ladder )
Independent Sources notes a phenomenon I have noticed for a long time on the internet:Majority of Digg Commenters Appear to Believe that Latest Terrorist Scare is Propoganda…It’s not restricted to terrorism. Pick any topic you want, and there will be
August 21st, 2006 at 11:07 am
Are you talking about the british skybombing arrest’s? The ones where they recovered plan tickets, bombmaking equipment, and martyrdom videos?
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5271998.stm
or maybe the Madrid bombings and London 7/7 attacks which lead to tightening security here.
I also question who are the ones politicizing the terrorism issue. When the 9/11 attacks occured there was an almost immediate outcry that the White House had been negligent. Some (Cynthia McKinney) outright accused the President of complicity for personal gain. In an effort to embarrass the administration there were calls by the then Democratically controlled Senate for a 9/11 commission. When that didn’t go quite the way they wanted they tried to hit the adminstration with a Senate Select SubComittee on Intelligence investigation into statements made about Iraq. When that backfired because the head of the committee said he was going to include statements made by Senators of both parties (Like this statement by Senator Carl Levin Sen. Levin: I think basically they decided immediately after 9/11 to go after Saddam. They began to- Look, there was plenty of evidence that Saddam had nuclear weapons, by the way. That is not in dispute. There is plenty of evidence of that) the democrats fillibustered the results then accused the adminstration of stonewalling.
If there is politicization going on it is happening on both sides
August 22nd, 2006 at 6:23 am
Please provide a link to the undisputed evidence that Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons or was extending his capacity to create said weapons in the period immediately prior to the current administration’s decision to make war on Iraq? Either your’re being ironic, Chad, or you live on another planet. Also, please point me to the quotiation in the article you linked where it indicates that airline tickets had been purchased by any of the supposed skybombers. Obviously these folks were up to something and it is good that they were interrupted but the idea that this was an imminent threat has dissipated rapidly since the story broke.
August 22nd, 2006 at 7:12 am
Read what I said Michael. I said that Carl Levine (D-Mich) made that statement. Ask him for the link. Or better yest ask the Iraqi scientist whose garden they dug the centrifuge out of.
August 22nd, 2006 at 12:16 pm
So no sourcing on either point? Ok then. I thought not. Again, perhaps I am just deaf to your irony. I sincerely hope that is the case.
August 22nd, 2006 at 12:54 pm
That’s a new requirement. Someone else makes a claim, I report they made the claim providing the quote. You ask me to substantiate the claim made by the third party. Sorry I can’t provide the sources Carl Levine used to reach his conclusion I don’t know what they were. However I looked it up for you and Sen. Levine made that claim on the 11/7/2005 issue of Hardball with Chris Matthews (so it is actually slightly out of sequence but since it was made more than two years after the invasion of Iraq it is probably still germane). The gas centrifuge was dug up 06/25/2003. http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/06/25/sprj.irq.centrifuge/
In the future I would appreciate it if you wouldn’t call me a liar.
Thanks
August 23rd, 2006 at 10:50 am
Not sure I ever called you a liar (although I did offer the conjecture that you are privy to some alternative universe). All the same, I’m sorry if you’re feelings were hurt. I simply asked that you provide some sourcing for the claims you were advocating. As for the article you linked, well, did you actually read it? The first paragraph indicates that the centrifuge components had been buried for TWELVE YEARS when they were unearthed from Mr. Obeidi’s garden – perhaps you noticed the subtitle “No Smoking Gun.” Hardly evidence that Iraq was ramping up a weapons program prior to our invasion, whether it is Levin or yourself advancing that line of reasoning. More over, a UN weapons inspector quoted in the article states explicitly that they KNEW that Saddam had given the order for scientests to hide equipment such as centrifuge components, meaning that this discovery was a) not unexpected, b) highly predictable and c) in no way demonstrative of increased efforts by Hussein’s government to expand its weapons making capabilities. No one disputes that Saddam has had, at some point, nuclear aims. The fraudulent claims of this administration have to do with their repeated claims that Hussein was moving substantially closer to that goal, something we now know to materially false, or at least, to date completely unproven. The article you linked regerences the beginnings of David Kay’s Iraq weapons inspection, which turned up – you guessed it – no evidence to support the Bush Administrations claims of increasing WMD risk from Iraq. Where I do agree, at least partically with Levin’s quoted statement, is that after 9/11, an Iraqi invasion became inevitable because it was a goal of this administration- Bush had his reasons, his advisors had their own – from day one. 9/11 gave this administration the political clout to get away with an invasion undertaken under false pretenses and only vaguely related to and most definitely taking resources away from global efforts to break up terrorist rings and domestic efforts to secure the homeland. And that, my friends, is what we call politicizing the terrorism issue.
August 23rd, 2006 at 12:27 pm
I did read it and I also noted where this:
Obeidi told CNN the parts of a gas centrifuge system for enriching uranium were part of a highly sophisticated system he was ordered to hide to be ready to rebuild the bomb program.
“I have very important things at my disposal that I have been ordered to have, to keep, and I’ve kept them, and I don’t want this to proliferate, because of its potential consequences if it falls in the hands of tyrants, in the hands of dictators or of terrorists,” said Obeidi, who has been taken out of Iraq with the help of the U.S. government.
this:
“It begins to tell us how huge our job is,” Kay said. “Remember, his material was buried in a barrel behind his house in a rose garden.
“There’s no way that that would have been discovered by normal international inspections. I couldn’t have done it. My successors couldn’t have done it.”
and this:
Experts said the documents and pieces Obeidi gave the United States were the critical information and parts to restart a nuclear weapons program, and would have saved Saddam’s regime several years and as much as hundreds of millions of dollars for research.
I also recall this from David Kay’s interim report in October 2003:
We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate concealment efforts have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been declared to the UN. Let me just give you a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of which I will elaborate on later:
· A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.
· A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.
· Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist’s home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons.
· New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.
· Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists’ homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).
· A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.
· Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the UN.
· Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km — well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.
· Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles –probably the No Dong — 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military equipment
And this from the Dulfer report
Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable:
* Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once already—during the Iran-Iraq war—and contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad.
While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered.
* The scale of the Iraqi conventional munitions stockpile, among other factors, precluded an examination of the entire stockpile; however, ISG inspected sites judged most likely associated with possible storage or deployment of chemical weapons.
Iraq’sCW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under sanctions, only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military and civilian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base.
* Poor policies and management in the early 1990s left the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) financially unsound and in a state of almost complete disarray.
* Saddam implemented a number of changes to the Regime’s organizational and programmatic structures after the departure of Husayn Kamil.
* Iraq’s acceptance of the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program was the foundation of Iraq’s economic recovery and sparked a flow of illicitly diverted funds that could be applied to projects for Iraq’s chemical industry.
The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW-related efforts.
* The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program.
* Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure, which would have enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented.
* Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not allowed to acquire due to sanctions. ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this system.
Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure, although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
* ISG did not discover chemical process or production units configured to produce key precursors or CW agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfiguring and ‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items.
* ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefings, that Iraq at OIF probably had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months.
* A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in significant quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its existing procurement networks for sanctioned items.
In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dual-use process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed activities, if required by the Regime.
* One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system for important dual-use process plants.
Iraq’s historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the capability to weaponize CW agent when the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences for ending UN sanctions, Iraq would have significantly jeopardized its chances of having sanctions lifted or no longer enforced if the UN or foreign entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization activities.
* ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots, which suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experimental CW rounds. The available evidence is insufficient to determine the nature of the effort or the timeframe of activities.
* Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions, throughout the 1990s, many of which had previously been adapted for filling with CW agent. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of weaponization activities.
Saddam’s Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi officers and included the concept of a “red-line” or last line of defense. However, ISG has no information that the plan ever included a trigger for CW use.
* Despite reported high-level discussions about the use of chemical weapons in the defense of Iraq, information acquired after OIF does not confirm the inclusion of CW in Iraq’s tactical planning for OIF. We believe these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions.
Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have been highly compartmentalized within the Regime. ISG found no credible evidence that any field elements knew about plans for CW use during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
* Uday—head of the Fedayeen Saddam—attempted to obtain chemical weapons for use during OIF, according to reporting, but ISG found no evidence that Iraq ever came into possession of any CW weapons.
ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications this was planned. (See Annex A.)
* ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.
* Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews with key IIS officials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS’ activities in this area.
* The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN.
* The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.
ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible movement and storage of chemical weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents, interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related.
* ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depot—the storage site that was judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no CW activity, unlike previously assessed.
Any guesses what a small quanity of Sarin would be perfect for? Think Tokyo Subway. That’s right a terror attack.
August 23rd, 2006 at 2:51 pm
I admire the research Chad, and yes, there is no doubt that remnants of Hussein’s pre-UN sanctions program remained in Iraq to potentially, one day, possibly be re-awakened and misused. This has never at any time been in dispute. However, the CONCLUSION of David Kay in his report was what? That there were no vast stockpiles of weapons, representing a buildup of WMDs, as the current administration had alleged and used to build up their case for war. Now maybe the weapons will turn up in Syria, or in never-never land, but the point is they were not there and that no conclusive evidence has yet been found to indicate that Iraq was making progress toward creating new weapons. Now, of course, I am not defending the Hussein regime or trying to pretend he was a nice guy. I’d also say that one could build a legitimate case for going into Iraq, but that is not what was done for this country. Instead a phony bill of good was sold by an administration who buy turns pressured and cherry picked in intelligence to support their case from an intelligence apparatus that refused at the highest level to stand up to the treatment. That is how the case for Iraq was built, unfortunately. And, again, unfortunately it has proved a resource-suck from the larger issue of combatting terrorism.
August 23rd, 2006 at 4:18 pm
I disagree, the President specifically said that Saddam was not an immediate threat but that he was no willing to wait until he was.
The problem was (and remains) an intelligence community which is very lacking in human intelligence capabilities. In the case of Iraq that lack was near universal, as evidenced by the exact same conclusions about Iraq being reached by the French, British, Germans, Russian, and (for all I know) Pago Pago intelligence services. There was no meaningful disagreement on Saddam’s capabilities, or as I recall, his intentions.
There was disagreement about the best way to deal with him led mainly by France and Russia both of whom, based on captured equipment, seemed to be violating the arms embargo.
David Kay’s conclusion about WMD after the invasion is irrelevant to the decision to invade, he had the advantage of being there. President Bush and his administration had an intelligence apparatus that was telling him Saddam had WMD, and that he was in league with terrorists. Remember George Tenet, a hold over from the previous administration, told the President it was a slam dunk Saddam had the weapons. This indicates to me a desire by the President to make sure our actions were justified. With a statement like that from the DCI and the recent history of 9/11 as a background it isn’t that surprising to me naysayers were given less attention than they otherwise might have been.
Does President Bush ultimately bear the blame for the invasion? Yes and 20 years from now history will probably judge him more moderately than his is being judged now.
Is it a resource suck from the larger war on terror? No. If it was we would not be sitting here today with no successful attacks on American soil since 9/11. The only possible argument that can be made for it being a resource suck is that we have not caught Osama Bin Ladin yet.
Well big hairy deal it took us 20 some years to catch Carlos the Jackal and a couple other of those retards who were killing people in the 80’s. Oh and by the way where did we catch them? Iraq. When did Khaddifi (the instigator of Pan Am 103 and at least two bombing in Germany) come clean about his weapons program? After Iraq. The important thing is OBL’s ability to do us harm is greatly reduced.
On the non-terror front we still have some challenges but they aren’t as big as it appears. North Korea is saber rattling now because they think we are distracted but that will change soon especially if the current offensive in Bagdhad yields results. China is not going to stand for a client state with Nukes and they aren’t willing to take us on yet. Iran is making a lot of noise too but they dont dare push too hard as we have 150,000 (roughly) troops on their doorstep and we have a logistics footprint to bring in more quite rapidly. I would estimate in 30 days we could double our troop strength there.
At this point the only reason things appear to be going poorly is we are fighting a limited war under the accepted rules of war (i.e We are not purposely targetting civilians or non-military targets), the enemy isn’t. His fighting is limited in that he doesnt have access to a standing army of heavy weaponry, but he also is not limited in his rules of engagement. In fact it works to his advantage to target civilians as it draws in our troops. This has no become a battle of wills, and not just between the US and the terrorists, but between those who understand that withdrawing before we have established a government that can a) engage the terrorists and and hold them and b) transfer power peacefully is a win for our enemies, and those who don’t.
OBL has listed a number of reasons he thought he could attack the US and get away with it. two of the biggies are:
1. Vietnam
2. Somalia
If we withdraw now we reinforce that lesson.
So for all those reasons I reject the premise that we should not have gone into Iraq, and I reject the idea that we should withdraw now.
This was kind of Stream of Conciousness writing but I kept getting interrupted and having to restart.
August 23rd, 2006 at 8:13 pm
Well Chad, I’ll let you have the last word, as this is your blog, which I enjoy – that being the reason I opted to comment in the first place. There are a lot of conclusions in the above piece that go beyond the scope of our prior conversation. I will say two things. First and foremost, the problem with the intelligence community was not faulty intelligence, but rather its utter failure to stand up to an administration that was simply looking to validate foregone conclusions. They did not act independently, but rather kowtowed to what the current administration wanted them to produce. The “bad intelligence” claim is just PR spin. They wanted to go into Iraq and they built a house of cards case and rammed it through. Secondly, and with this I bid you good night, the fact that we have not had another 9/11 style attack in this country is in no way evidence that Iraq has not taken away resources from the war on terror. Nor is the absence of an attack even evidence that our antiterrorism efforts are all that they should be. I hope you can see the fallacy in implying such a causality. Take care.
August 24th, 2006 at 3:49 am
So the fact that the intelligence community was presenting the same information to the previous administration, and the previous administration came to the same conclusions about Iraq’s capabilities and intentions indicates this administrations determination to attack Iraq. Oh that’s right we are only talking about this administration. Everything regarding both Iraq and Terrorism exists in a vaccum in the 7 1/2 months between the time President Bush took office and the 9/11 attacks. The Iraq Liberation Act didn’t exist, the following statements were never uttered:
One way or the other, we are determined to deny Iraq the capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. That is our bottom line.”
– President Clinton, Feb. 4, 1998
“If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear. We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program.”
– President Bill Clinton, Feb. 17, 1998
“We must stop Saddam from ever again jeopardizing the stability and security of his neighbors with weapons of mass destruction.”
– Madeline Albright, Feb 1, 1998
“He will use those weapons of mass destruction again, as he has ten times since 1983.”
– Sandy Berger, Clinton National Security Adviser, Feb, 18, 1998
“[W]e urge you, after consulting with Congress, and consistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws, to take necessary actions (including, if appropriate, air and missile strikes on suspect Iraqi sites) to respond effectively to the threat posed by Iraq’s refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs.”
Letter to President Clinton.
– (D) Senators Carl Levin, Tom Daschle, John Kerry, others, Oct. 9, 1998
“Saddam Hussein has been engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction technology which is a threat to countries in the region and he has made a mockery of the weapons inspection process.”
– Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D, CA), Dec. 16, 1998
“Hussein has … chosen to spend his money on building weapons of mass destruction and palaces for his cronies.”
– Madeline Albright, Clinton Secretary of State, Nov. 10, 1999
That was all pre-Bush administration. There is more Post Jan 2001 but I am late for work so you will have to look it up yourself. The fact that you discount the years of antagonism between the US and Iraq as a factor in the invasion indicates that your hatred of the President is your overriding concern. I’m done with this argument.
August 24th, 2006 at 10:14 am
Quoting comments from 1998 is ridiculous when the whole point of what was found when we went into Iraq was, essentially, that their weapons programs had not progressed since that time and were not in the process of increasing. If anything, they had degraded and none of the quotes you cited from the Kay report indicate anything but that. You could probably also find comments from the Korean war that say that North Korea was a threat. It doesn’t really make them validate the Bush administration’s tactics. I’ve never mentioned hating the president (that would be an assumption on your part) and ever statement that I have made about the activities of the current administration in the lead-up to the war is imminently sourceable. I maintain that you have never, through all the rigmaroll and shifting ground above, offered any evidence to support your initial comments (or Levin’s comments) regarding Iraq unsdisputably ramping up their nuclear weapons program. You just haven’t, and the fact that you are willing to accept the information you cited as evidence points to faults in your own biases – not mine. And that’s a shame.
August 24th, 2006 at 2:50 pm
I don’t know where you got the idea that we are discussing what was found after Iraq was invaded. Since my comments have been directed towards the run up to the invasion, the intelligence failures and the aftermath. In that context what was said in 1998 is relevant. I also never said that Iraq was ramping up their nuclear program I said that is what the intelligence agencies indicated. Again there was an intelligence failure. Obviously I can’t prove what I never claimed or what has in fact been proven to be mistaken. (which I never denied by the way).
August 25th, 2006 at 7:55 am
Actually, this conversation (I don’t really feel that it is an argument…) was started by your quotation of the Levin comment, to which I asked for the following:
“Please provide a link to the undisputed evidence that Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons or was extending his capacity to create said weapons in the period immediately prior to the current administration’s decision to make war on Iraq?”
This is what we’ve been discussing, no?
The comments made in 1998 are only relevent to the idea that the Clinton administration advocated continuing to pressure Iraq to prevent them from ever re-invigorating their weapons program. At the time, that mean aerial patrols and missile strikes, combined with economic sanctions.
The effectiveness of these policies can certainly be debated, buy everything that has been found since the invasion pretty much indicates that they had worked to prevent Iraq from, to date, restarting any weapons program.
I would submit that you are misusing the idea of Iraq as a threat because you are assuming meanings that were not a part of those statements, which were meant to advocate an entirely different policy than the invasion that the current administration has undertaken.
Now, as to the issue of whether or not pre-war intelligence indicated that Iraq had been rebuilding their weapons program, there is ample evidence that the data was schmoozed and cherry-picked to validate the position the administration already knew it wanted to take – invasion.
There were also obvious scare tactics used in public statements by administration officials to indicate that the threat from weapons of mass destruction was imminent and that Iraq was in some way connected to 9/11 (something that the President only admited this week to be untrue), but that the vice president has been insisting on for years now.
Why would you give them a free pass on these points? I just don’t understand it. There far more evidence to indicate that the current administration was deceptive in the lead-up to the war than evidence to support their pre-war claims.
August 25th, 2006 at 9:32 am
My quotation of the Levin remark was in response to your statement that Republicans are politicizing the terror issue. It was offered as a evidence that members of both parties overestimated and continued to oversetimate the threats. (Levin’s statements were made in 2005 by the way).
I am not giving the administration a free pass but I believe this was an issue that had been building since Operation Desert Storm and the history of the political rhetoric shows wscalation since that time. The discussion of Saddam having / reconstituting WMD programs began in the previous adminsitration.
That was the intelligence and Intelligence community mindset that was inhereted in this administration. After 9/11 those threats took on a much more ominous tone. Hindsight now shows that the intelliegence was flawed. Hindsight is 20/20. In hindsight it also wouldhave been much better if Bush had cleaned house at the CIA when he took office. It didn’t happen, because of a misguided attempt to be “bi-partisan” and an expressed desire to concentrate on domestic issues.
(I personally still think there are stockpiles in Iraq, as evidenced by the discoveries earlier this year. And yes I know those were old weapons, but they had supposedly been destroyed. Part of the problem is the Iraqi army did not mark chemical weapons like most other armies. That practice started during the Iran / Iraq war in order to hide chemical attacks from foreign observers)
Here is where I think this administration really hosed up- In estimating the number of troops required for occupation duty. We relied too heavily on the Iraqi national Congress for Human Intel, and assumptions were made about the stability of the country after the fall of Saddam that were not justified.
Huge mistake and it has cost us in the short term, but in the long run we will probably be better off. Instead of us just installing a governemnt and leaving the country is now following the German model and rebuilding it’s institutions. Don’t forget that for 5 years after WWII there was an active guerilla movement in Germany, but they have generally turned out OK.
So in closing do I agree with everything that has happened? No. Do I believe the President had a preset agenda to go to Iraq? No. Am I now done with this thread? Yes.